Social Education 57(6), 1993, pp. 318-325
1993 National Council for the Social Studies

Key Elements of a Global Perspective

Roland Case*
Without doubt, promoting a "global perspective" is a central goal of global education (Alladin 1989, 6; Anderson 1982, 169; Kniep 1985, 12-18; K. Tye 1990, 163). Although many have written on the subject since Robert Hanvey's seminal work, An Attainable Global Perspective (1976), considerable need for explication remains (Massialas 1991, 448-50). Significantly, Hanvey (1976, 1) describes his account as "a beginning effort to define some elements of what we call a global perspective-to flesh out some of the things that we need to know and understand if we are to cope with the challenges of an increasingly interdependent world." My contribution to this endeavor is to distinguish two interrelated dimensions of a global perspective-the substantive and the perceptual-and to explain key elements of each, but particularly of the latter.
The substantive dimension refers to knowledge of various features of the world and how it works. It promotes knowledge of people and places beyond students' own community and country, and knowledge of events and issues beyond the local and immediate. Included in this dimension is knowledge of interconnected global systems, international events, world cultures, global geography, and so on. The perceptual dimension, reflected in contrasting spatial metaphors such as narrow or broad, provincial or cosmopolitan, and parochial or far-reaching, describes an orientation or outlook. Used in this context, global perspective refers to the capacity to see the "whole picture" whether focusing on a local or an international matter. Promoting the perceptual dimension involves nurturing perspectives that are empathic, free of stereotypes, not predicated on naive or simplistic assumptions, and not colored by prejudicial sentiments. This dimension underlies Perinbaum's (1989, 25) observation that global education is a way of looking at the world.

Coombs (1988) offers an explanation of perspective that further illuminates the distinction I propose. According to Coombs, having a perspective implies: (1) a "point of view"-a vantage point from which, or a lens through which, observations occur, and (2) some "object" of attention-an event, thing, person, place, or state of affairs that is the focus of the observations. For example, to speak of various perspectives on schooling suggests looking at schools-the object-through the eyes, or in light of the concerns or interests, of various people-the points of view. Schooling could be viewed from the perspectives of students, parents, teachers, administrators, governments, and industry. Other kinds of points of view exist than those implied by differing interest groups, including those of different fields of inquiry (e.g., economical, ethical, sociological, and psychological points of view) and different philosophical, psychological, or political orientations (e.g., liberal and conservative, moderate and radical, optimistic and pessimistic, romantic and realistic, and socialist and capitalist points of view).

To apply Coombs's terminology to ideas presented here, the substantive dimension identifies the objects of a global perspective-those world events, states of affairs, places, and things that global educators want students to understand. The perceptual dimension is the points of view-the matrix of concepts, orientations, values, sensibilities, and attitudes-from which we want students to perceive the world. I was shown the way that point of view shapes understanding of the object of inquiry when I recently examined freehand maps of the world drawn from memory by a group of preservice teachers.1 As might be expected, the vast majority depicted North America in the center of the map and with a relatively high degree of accuracy and detail. Other continents were relegated to the "outer reaches" of the page and often reduced to vague blotches far smaller than their actual land masses warranted. Occasionally, specific land features in foreign countries, such as the Baja peninsula in Mexico (a favored vacation spot for many British Columbians) and the boot of Italy, were exaggerated or rendered with atypical precision. These maps, with their uneven, distorted treatments of the various continents, are indicative of the ways our understandings are mediated by the lenses through which we view the world (Downs and Stea 1973, 18-22). Notice that egocentric factors-physical proximity, affiliation, and personal experience-shape the way these preservice teachers see the world (Downs and Stea 1973, 9; Saarinen 1973).

Explicating a global perspective involves specifying both the range of global phenomena to be explored (the objects) and the desired cognitive and affective lenses through which this examination is to occur (the points of view).

The Need for Greater Clarity
We should not automatically assume that greater clarity about the goals of global education is necessary. Loosely defined coalitions, whether of ideas or of individuals, often permit otherwise disparate factions to ally in pursuit of common, or at least compatible goals. A plurality of global educators-some focusing on environmental concerns, others on human rights issues, and still others on impediments to economic development-jointly contribute to a common cause, namely, helping to prepare students for the world they must face. As Popkewitz (1980, 304) notes, the term global education operates as an educational slogan-a positive emotive label that creates a "unity of feeling and spirit about the tasks to be confronted in schooling." Attempts to more clearly define the aims risk dividing, and possibly alienating, global education enthusiasts.

Despite the potential merits of conceptual vagueness, we need to achieve clarity about a global perspective (Becker 1982, 228-29). The most compelling reason, put starkly, is that we may otherwise squander a historic opportunity. Although present levels of public interest in global issues are high, the political and educational will to prepare students to handle global challenges may not be indefatigable. We would be wise to recall that support for alternative energy sources to fossil fuel was at its zenith during, and not after, the oil supply crisis. The possibility that support for global education will decline, even though world problems are bound to persist or intensify, suggests that global educators should capitalize on the significant, but likely limited, opportunity to build into the educational infrastructure a sound global component-that is, to institutionalize global education in the daily practices of teachers, in textbooks and other instructional resources, in the prescribed curricula for each subject, and in preservice and in-service teacher education programs (B. Tye 1990, 43).

Deficiencies in prevalent understandings of the notion of a global perspective may hamper success in institutionalizing a rich conception of global education. Many educators unwittingly adopt strategies that are tangential, or even antagonistic, to the most defensible core goals of global education. As Popkewitz (1980, 304) cautions, a slogan "can create the illusion that an institution is responding to its constituency whereas the needs and interests actually served are other than those publicly expressed." Others have voiced this concern about popular slogans. For example, critics of the current U.S. "war on drugs" and earlier critics of the so-called war on poverty claim that these tough-sounding slogans mask the U.S. government's refusals to fund genuine, but expensive, assaults on these problems. I am not implying deliberate attempts to misconstrue global education; rather, efforts to promote global understanding are sometimes misplaced because of dubious interpretations of the global perspective slogan (Ad Hoc Committee 1987, 245-47; Anderson 1982, 168-69).

Insufficient attention to the implicit and explicit views of the world communicated to students threatens to undermine the legitimate goals of global education. For example, curriculum materials purporting to promote global understanding often adopt a food-costumes-customs approach to other cultures-that is, the study of other cultures is limited to relatively superficial features of their life-styles. Exposing students to ethnic dishes and strange holiday practices is unlikely to promote an enlightened perspective on the lives and concerns of people in these "foreign" cultures (Zachariah 1989). By attending to limited, and to some extent trivial, cultural dimensions, global educators may actually reinforce stereotypical perceptions (Schuncke 1984, 249). For example, North American students may think of South America as a primitive frontier if their exposure to this continent is entirely in the context of subsistence farming, civil unrest, genocide, and deforestation. Conversely, if such students never see instances of third world initiative, self-sufficiency, and excellence, we should not be surprised if they regard people from these countries with condescending paternalism.

These are not idle concerns. Mpanya (1989) found that many educational resources about Africa prepared by development education groups in the United States reinforce stereotypes. A review of social studies curricula across Canada indicates that treatment of Africa, South America, and the Middle East focuses predominantly on ancient (and now fallen) civilizations, and that Africa and South America tend to be treated as monolithic entities (Case 1989, 6). Simply teaching more about the world is not the solution-merely having more information may not advance students' understanding. As I have suggested, much of what we notice and the inferences we draw depend upon the lenses though which we filter the raw data. Approaching a study with a jaundiced attitude is likely to confirm, not dispel, prejudices-a racist watching the beating of a person from another racial group may well see justice being done. Developing appropriate conceptual and moral lenses through which to view global interactions may be more crucial than acquiring extensive information (Lamy 1990, 49).

Ultimately, nebulous definitions of goals may hasten withdrawal of support for global education by fueling sentiments like those expressed by former U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett about the "wishy-washy" nature of a global perspective: "When I hear 'geography' and 'history' I am pleased; when I hear 'global perspectives,' I'm usually a little nervous" (Rothman 1987, 16). Clearer articulation of defensible core features of a global perspective, and their rationale, may help the global education movement avoid the pitfalls identified by its critics.

The Substantive Dimension
As indicated above, the substantive dimension refers to the range of global topics about which people should be informed. Although many writers have offered accounts of what I refer to as the substantive dimension, Kniep and Hanvey are the most widely cited.2

Kniep's (1986) account of global education primarily addresses the substantive dimension, although he touches upon the perceptual dimension at several points, such as when mentioning that global education will alter students' perspectives on their own worldview (438) and contribute to a sense of interconnectedness (439). For Kniep, however, the defining goals of global education are those that distinguish it from other educational endeavors. Not surprisingly, as the title of his essay-"Defining a Global Education by Its Content"-suggests, these unique features are found in the "content" of global education.3 He identifies four elements as the focus of global studies:

  • In his classic monograph, Hanvey (1976) identifies five elements of a global

  • Hanvey's concept of a global perspective spans my two dimensions in ways that Kniep's account does not, although only "perspective consciousness" falls primarily in the perceptual dimension. Aspects of Hanvey's other four elements cross the boundaries between the substantive and perceptual dimensions; these four elements, however, largely describe "content" somewhat similarly to Kniep's list. In the context of the substantive dimension, the only major difference between Hanvey and Kniep lies in the emphases of one pair of their elements: Kniep's fourth element (global history) stresses the historical roots and evolution of our current state of affairs, whereas Hanvey's fifth element (knowledge of alternatives) stresses possible future alternatives to present conditions. Both are desirable components of students' knowledge of the world.

    Because Kniep's and Hanvey's accounts of the substantive dimension are extensive, unproblematic, and complementary, detailed review or comparison of their accounts is unnecessary. It is sufficient to conclude this section with a composite list of elements identified by Hanvey and Kniep and to refer the reader to the original works for further articulation. Thus, I suggest that the substantive dimension of a global perspective involves understanding of the following elements:

    1.universal and cultural values and practices (Kniep's "human values" and Hanvey's "cross-cultural awareness"); interconnections (Kniep's "global systems" and Hanvey's "global dynamics");
    3.present worldwide concerns and conditions (Kniep's "global issues and problems" and Hanvey's "world conditions"); and past patterns of worldwide affairs (Kniep's "global history");
    5.alternative future directions in worldwide affairs (Hanvey's "knowledge of alternatives").

    The Perceptual Dimension
    The perceptual dimension, which is the lens for the substantive dimension, is made up of various intellectual values, dispositions, and attitudes that distinguish a parochial perspective (i.e., making sense of the world from superficial, narrow, self-absorbed points of view) from a broad-minded perspective (i.e., making sense of the world from "enlightened" points of view). Hanvey (1976, 2) similarly suggests that a global perspective consists of "modes of thought, sensitivities, intellectual skills, and explanatory capacities." The five interrelated elements I offer as constituents of the perceptual dimension are open-mindedness, anticipation of complexity, resistance to stereotyping, inclination to empathize, and nonchauvinism. These elements are neither additional pieces of information about the world nor what some might refer to as skills-they do not identify what students can do as much as what students are disposed to notice and to accept-and they are not the sort of traits that are acquired predominantly through repeated practice, especially if this is performed out of context. For example, students do not develop empathy by practicing what it might feel like to be a rock, a dog, or an Eskimo. Before discussing each of these elements and suggesting how educators might foster them, I will explain the implied "value-laden" nature of this conception.

    Global education, like education generally, cannot and should not be value-free. Every educational goal is an implied commitment to promote certain values over others (e.g., literacy is preferred to illiteracy, democratic ideals are superior to authoritarian values, and honesty is prized while deceit is condemned). The issue in education is not whether but which values ought to be promoted. Disputes over implied values in global education, especially disputes surrounding some global educators' ambiguous positions on moral relativism and national fidelity, have been particularly stormy (Ad Hoc Committee 1987; Jenness 1990, 313; Lamy 1990). The justifications for all values, however, are not equally contentious. Contrast the implied values in the perceptual dimension I describe with the values implied by differing worldviews represented within the global education movement as identified by Lamy.

    In one article, Lamy (1987, 3-5) characterizes proponents of global education according to three orientations toward world affairs: some seek to maintain the status quo, others promote moderate reform of the existing world order, and still others advocate fundamental transformation of our global systems. In a subsequent article, Lamy (1990, 56-62) offers four contending images: national self-interest, international community or cooperation, utopian socialist ideals, and utopian conservative values. The orientations and images Lamy describes differ in an important respect from my account of the perceptual dimension: the former imply particular positions on controversial questions-rational persons might disagree, for example, whether global transformation or global reform is more desirable. On the other hand, the underlying value of the perceptual dimension is essentially that a broad-minded perspective is preferred over a parochial perspective-that is, it is better to formulate opinions about the world on the basis of extensive, open-minded inquiry than on the basis of unexamined or questionable assumptions. All who believe in promoting rational reflection should endorse this implied value.

    Proponents of any of Lamy's worldviews may be guilty of indoctrination if they fail to encourage students to reach their own thoughtful conclusions after a fair airing of opposing views. As Litke (1975, 93) suggests, "Concern about indoctrination is often concern about closing minds on open issues." And the right to rationally make up one's own mind is a cherished tenet of liberal democracies. Thus, although my account of a global perspective is not value-neutral, it does not prejudge for educators or students the particular position they should adopt on contentious issues such as the merits of maintaining the current world order.

    The five elements discussed below represent key cognitive and affective attributes associated with a global perspective that global educators (and educators generally) should address.

    Open-mindedness is the crucial feature of the perceptual dimension. It identifies a willingness to base our beliefs on the impartial consideration of available evidence (Hare 1983, 9). This means being disposed to change current beliefs when warranted and to make up our mind on new issues on the basis of a fair hearing of all sides. A corollary of being open-minded is having a tendency to suspend making firm judgments when evidence is inconclusive or when a thorough review of available information has not been carried out. As the Scottish philosopher David Hume observed, a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.

    Clearly, open-mindedness is a matter of degree. We are more open-minded if we actively seek out possible objections to positions than if we are willing merely to reconsider matters when presented with conflicting evidence. In addition, we may be open-minded with regard to some issues and not others, often depending on the degree of personal investment in the issue. For example, we are less likely to be open-minded when deeply held values, self-interest, or personal, cultural, or national identity are at stake. Notice that open-mindedness might best be encouraged among students by helping them accept not being right all the time, appreciating the value of deciding important matters on the basis of thorough analysis, and learning to live with ambiguity-that is, to be satisfied with tentative conclusions until full review of complex issues can be carried out.

    Having an open mind does not imply a "correct" or single "true" position on every issue: both environmentalists and industrialists can be open-minded provided both are willing to reassess their views in the light of new arguments. Nor is it the case that an open-minded person is noncommittal or wishy-washy. When open-minded people have what they consider compelling evidence that, say, apartheid is immoral, they will be resolute. The key factor in open-mindedness is that their conviction does not preclude reconsidering their position when confronted with new evidence or changing circumstances. Furthermore, we can be mistaken and still be open-minded, provided we sincerely attempt, however imperfectly, to assess counterarguments.

    To a considerable extent, open-mindedness presupposes what Hanvey (1976, 4-5) refers to as "perspective consciousness." We are unlikely to be open-minded unless we understand that different people see the world differently. Differences in personal and cultural perspectives extend beyond varying opinions on specific issues-what Hanvey calls the "surface layer" of one's perspective-to include the more fundamental, often unconscious assumptions and conceptions that shape how we see the world-what he calls a "view of the world" or cognitive map. Since Hanvey (1976, 4-5) believes that few of us can transcend our cultural perspective, he is content merely to promote greater awareness of the variability of perspectives among groups. Open-mindedness implies a more ambitious and somewhat controversial requirement-a willingness to assess our worldviews.

    The prospect of open-mindedness about fundamental issues is controversial because of a perceived impermeability of the "deeper levels" of our worldviews (Hare 1983, 48-58). Critics note that our fundamental beliefs and values predispose us to accept certain arguments over others and, therefore, each of us is inevitably closed to positions not consistent with our deeply rooted assumptions. Certainly, worldview influences beliefs-the power of our worldview to shape our opinions is the very reason for promoting open-mindedness. It is not clearly the case, however, that each person's worldview is beyond critical introspection, especially in the case of young adults, who are seen typically to be more open than older adults. Although we cannot critically assess our entire conceptual and normative framework at once, we can subject aspects of it to scrutiny, provided we are inclined to do so.

    The way to inspect and assess our fundamental assumptions is analogous to the way sailors might repair a boat at sea one plank at a time (Dworkin 1986, 111). At any given time, the balance of our array of foundational beliefs provides the infrastructure against which we can assess particular assumptions. For example, my unqualified commitment to democracy may be called into question when democratically elected governments violate the rights of minority groups. The failure of democracy to promote other cherished principles such as respect for individual freedoms provides the grounds for my reconsidering whether democracy is always the best form of government. In turn, my conviction about the paramountcy of individual freedoms may be challenged if application of this principle leads to gross inequities in the distribution of life-sustaining goods. Thus, one at a time-like replacing the planks of a ship at sea-our assumptions can be scrutinized. The prospect of change in worldview is limited, however, if we are unwilling to entertain potential counterarguments to our current orientations.

    The most commonly suggested approach to promoting open-mindedness among students is to examine the perspectives of various groups as a means of raising students' awareness of the existence of differing worldviews and of the cultural influences shaping their own worldviews. As suggested above, open-mindedness can be encouraged more directly by challenging students' reasoning in nonthreatening ways and by inviting students to reconsider fundamental assumptions by assessing their implications in problematic contexts (Coombs 1980).4 It may be particularly effective to focus attention on strategic "planks" of students' worldviews, especially on their sense of fairness and enlightened self-interest. For example, students may be prodded into reassessing their positions on international trade disputes by having them explore possible double standards in their attitudes toward their own country's right to restrict foreign imports or corporate takeovers and the rights of other countries to do likewise. Modeling too may be important-educators who are open-minded and who value open-mindedness are more likely to foster these attributes in their students (Torney-Purta 1983). It may also be effective to provide examples and role-play opportunities for students to experience the negative consequences of closed-mindedness.

    The importance of open-mindedness in developing a global perspective should be self-evident. On pragmatic grounds, it is plausible to expect that we are more likely to reach sound conclusions if we are willing to consider seriously the possibility that we may be mistaken. Similarly, we are more likely to be mistaken if, instead of suspending judgment in the absence of full inquiry, we adopt a firm position on the basis of inconclusive analysis. Also, when making decisions that affect others, fairness requires that we make judgments only after a balanced examination of the situation. When promoting more thoughtful worldviews, however, educators must be careful to distinguish between, on the one hand, encouraging open-mindedness by questioning students' assumptions and exposing students to alternative worldviews, and, on the other, promoting predetermined opinions on issues by pressuring students to change their existing beliefs.

    Anticipation of complexity
    Anticipation of complexity refers to the inclination to look beyond simplistic explanations of complex ethical and empirical issues and to see global phenomena as part of a constellation of interrelated factors. In other words, it involves fostering our skepticism of explanations that fail to consider with sufficient imagination the range of interacting global factors and the breadth of plausible consequences. Anticipating complexity is centrally tied to the interrelated nature of global forces, but is different in an important respect from the prevalent goal of promoting an interdependent view of the world. We should be somewhat cautious about use of the term interdependence to describe global interrelations. As Hanvey (1976, 25) notes, interdependence connotes a sense of reciprocity or mutual dependency which is potentially misleading because many global interconnections reflect grossly unequal dependencies. As he suggests with regard to trade between the economically weak and the economically strong, although in some sense they need each other, they possess decidedly unequal bargaining powers. The call to resist seeing events in the world as isolated and localized, which is the thrust of my account of anticipating complexity, avoids the connotations implied by the term interdependent.

    Although it is inevitable and often desirable that global education issues be simplified somewhat, it is important that educators and curriculum developers avoid encouraging superficial or naive views (i.e., black-and-white accounts and definitive lists of the causes of events). Educators can discourage simple-mindedness by teaching in the context of global systems that stress the matrix of contributory factors involved in most global events and encourage the inclination to expect ramifications. For example, solutions to global population problems should be discussed in the context of inextricably linked factors such as resource management, urbanization, food production, health care, and religious and social mores. It may be important to provide examples of complex interrelations, such as those contained in Anderson's (1990) compelling account of the extensive international connections of most aspects of U.S. society. Fostering student appreciation of global complexity may require replacing survey-type exploration of many topics with fewer, but more in-depth, analyses of strategically selected case studies or issues (Newmann 1991, 330). In general, educators who model an appreciation of the complexity of most issues are seen to influence positively student acquisition of this attribute (Newmann 1991, 330).

    The need to promote acceptance of global complexity stems from both the psychological difficulty many of us experience when faced with complexity and the intellectual demands of subjecting complex issues to the requisite levels of analysis. If we are not alert to, or refuse to acknowledge, the messy reality of many of our enduring global predicaments, we will be satisfied with crude and simplistic responses to problems. Simplified solutions, however, are unlikely to succeed-world famine will not be resolved by producing more food (we already produce enough food to feed everyone) and we will not eliminate poverty merely by creating more jobs (many people considered to be below the poverty line are fully employed or are not capable of working). Unless we anticipate the global ramifications of a course of action, we are less likely to advocate proposals that accommodate adequately the intricate, interconnected nature of many global situations. A case in point is the so-called green revolution that failed to appreciate adequately the social, psychological, financial, and agricultural implications of abandoning supposedly unsophisticated farming practices.

    Resistance to stereotyping
    Resistance to stereotyping refers to a skepticism about the adequacy of accounts of people, cultures, or nations that either are limited to a narrow range of characteristics (i.e., important features of the group are ignored) or depict little or no diversity within them (i.e., group heterogeneity is ignored). Unlike the previously discussed element that focuses on explaining events with appropriate intricacy, resisting stereotyping involves describing groups of people with sufficient diversity. For example, a Polish academic recently complained about the tendency in the West to talk about Eastern Europe as if it were a single entity; he warned that in communicating with this region we must attend to the diversity within and among countries. Similarly, the crude treatment of African culture in many social studies textbooks fails to do justice to the fundamental differences among African cultures and to their richness (Beckett and Darling 1988, 2-3). Often stereotyping occurs when global educators, however well-intentioned, focus on the quaint or exotic features of a culture. For example, curriculum resources often stereotype Egypt as a museum or curiosity piece-as the land of pyramids and sphinxes.

    In addition to cultural stereotyping, a particularly relevant form of stereotyping is the inclination to pose we-they dualisms. Casting issues as "our country against other countries" is stereotyping whenever it disguises mutual international interest in supposedly national concerns. Similarly, dualisms among international sectors (e.g., north-south, east-west, developed-developing countries) involve stereotyping whenever the interests of all countries in a bloc are reduced to the interests of the bloc and set in opposition to the interests of other blocs. The problems with these dualisms are their tendencies to ignore the cross-boundary similarities and shared interests in many problems (e.g., Eastern Europeans are likely as concerned about cancer as are North Americans) and to polarize camps on issues when divisions are not warranted (e.g., ending the nuclear arms race was a goal shared by people on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain). Of course, when discussing the extent of overlapping global interests, we must be careful not to imply a solidarity that is not warranted-sectorial and national antagonisms underlie many international situations. Resisting stereotyping among international blocs and alliances is an attempt to avoid distorting the extent to which this competition exists (i.e., not to characterize unduly each nation and its allies as competing with other parts of the world).

    The previously mentioned strategies for promoting appreciation of global complexity are appropriate for encouraging appreciation of global diversity: gross generalizations about people and nations should be discouraged, and examples of cultural and political heteronomy should be provided continually. Although more extensive study of fewer cultures or nations may be preferred to the relatively superficial study of many peoples, we must guard against stereotypical impressions encouraged when a heterogeneous entity, say Africa, is considered exclusively in the context of one sample, say Nigeria. A further critical factor is the need for educators to possess sufficient knowledge of the topic under study so that they will be able to recognize and counter stereotypical observations by students.

    Resisting stereotypes is important because unflattering stereotypes of people, cultures, or nations are often deliberately encouraged. For example, creating hostile stereotypical images of people from an opposing country is often used to fuel widespread hatred against an enemy (Silverstein 1989). Even in situations where the motives are benign, the effects of stereotyping are often undesirable. Condescending and paternalistic attitudes toward people in developing countries may be a function partly of our stereotypical images of these people (Werner et al. 1977, 33). Building students' resistance to stereotypical accounts decreases any inclination to dehumanize or marginalize groups, because they see these groups as having a full range of human attributes. In other words, we may discourage hostility against other nations and cultures by "inoculating" students against accepting portrayals of foreigners "as cardboard characters in a stilted puppet play" (Zachariah 1989, 51). On a positive note, developing students' resistance to stereotyping may encourage global cooperation by increasing their appreciation of the similarities and shared interests among people, and by combating tendencies to balkanize international interests unfairly.

    Inclination to empathize
    This element identifies a willingness and capacity to place ourselves in the role or predicament of others or at least to imagine issues from other individuals' or groups' perspectives. Naturally, this does not imply that we must agree with the positions taken by others or be supportive in all cases-it requires solely that we try to understand in a vivid way what others think and how they feel. Empathy is not the same as open-mindedness, although the two are somewhat interrelated. The ability to sensitively imagine another's perspective requires suspending, however temporarily, our own feelings. To this extent, empathy presupposes a degree of openness to ways different from our own.

    Empathy does not require that we feel exactly what another feels-what Hanvey (1976, 11-12) calls "transspection"-rather, empathy requires merely that we relate to, or identify with, another's feelings. The following example illustrates this distinction. Suppose I am asked to consider how a Japanese person might feel if he had just maligned the reputation of his dead relatives. If I put myself in his shoes but import my own values, I might feel slightly disloyal-I certainly would not feel mortified, since respect for the dead is not a matter of profound personal honor for me. I do not in any real sense feel what the Japanese person feels since I have not placed myself in his predicament. For Hanvey, transspection requires that I adopt the Japanese person's values and come, however temporarily, to care deeply about ancestral honor. Only then will I feel what he feels. By insisting that global educators promote transspection, Hanvey has placed an excessive duty on us. A more typical explanation of empathy is a middle ground between claiming that either I enter the other's world completely (i.e., adopt the other's values) or I remain in my world (i.e., resort to my own values). I do not have to know what it would be like to feel mortified because I violated ancestral honor in order to feel for the Japanese person. Since I know what it would be like to feel mortified if I had, say, shamed my spouse, I can appreciate how the Japanese person might feel in his predicament. In contrast to Hanvey's suggestion that we should adopt temporarily the other's way of life, it is sufficient that we know enough about that person's situation to imagine sensitively analogous sets of circumstances within our own worlds.

    There are several ways of enhancing students' capacity and inclination to see the humanness of others and to identify with them. Educators who model their empathy for others are thought to nurture empathic tendencies in their students. Selected films, novels, plays, and stories can be used effectively to sensitize students to the predicament of others (Brynes 1988, 270-71; Pate 1988, 287). Role-play and providing opportunities for meaningful contact among different social and ethnic groups are also recommended (Brynes 1988, 269-71).

    The rationale for promoting empathy stems from the fact that merely learning more about other people or countries may not increase students' understanding of them. Certainly, the inclination to empathize with others will not, and should not, necessarily result in increased acceptance-a sensitive exposure to certain practices may legitimately redouble students' sense of another's oddness or unreasonableness. Thus, promoting empathy is not tantamount to encouraging moral relativism (Ad Hoc Committee 1987, 246-47). We cannot be confident that we have adequately and fairly appreciated the views and practices of others, however, unless we have attempted to empathize with them. As the common expression suggests, we should not criticize others until we have walked in their shoes.

    Chauvinism refers to an unreasoned and excessive devotion to one's own group, whether that affiliation is based on gender, race, nationality, citizenship, or some other trait. Nonchauvinism refers to the inclination neither to prejudice our judgments of others because we are not affiliated with them, nor to discount unfairly the interests of others even if, on occasion, they are incompatible with our own interests. Chauvinism was reflected recently in contrasting descriptions of British and Iraqi actions provided by the British press at the height of the Persian Gulf War. More specifically, British forces were described as "cautious" and "loyal," and Iraqi troops as "cowardly" and "blindly obedient"; British sorties were "first strikes" and "preemptive" while Iraqi initiatives were "sneak missile attacks" and "without provocation" (Manchester Guardian, February 1991). These accounts are chauvinistic even if we all agree that Iraq deserves condemnation for provoking the war, because otherwise identical actions are judged differently here merely because of which side performs them.

    One form of chauvinism is ethnocentrism-the view that one's own cultural group is superior to all others. It is not necessarily ethnocentric to prefer most features of North American life to analogous customs and practices in other cultures; rather, it is ethnocentric to judge them better simply because they are our ways. The study of other cultures is little more than cultural narcissism if students lock into the mind-set that their ways of doing things are inherently superior. As Jenness (1990, 412) remarked in his extensive review of the history of social studies, some educators are concerned that "the world studies program may well turn out to be a fatter photo album, ethnocentrically selected and arranged."

    National chauvinism is another, somewhat more politically sensitive, form of chauvinism (Freeman 1991, 4). Nonchauvinism in this regard refers to a willingness when appropriate to assess impartially policies and events involving our own country, and to recognize that on some occasions national best interests, as opposed to the interests of other countries or people, should not be paramount. An example of obsessive national aggrandizement is found in a Hearst newspaper criticism of the supposed pro-British bias of a U.S. textbook because, in describing the Battle of Bunker Hill, it suggested that "three times the British returned courageously to the attack" (Fleming 1981, 374). As a result of the newspaper's protest, the textbook was revised absurdly to read "three times the cowardly British returned to the attack."

    Encouraging nonchauvinism is not inconsistent with promoting patriotism and national interests-chauvinism refers to fanatical patriotism, blind obedience, and unreasoning devotion. In fact, a willingness to scrutinize national policies and to consider other nations' interests may be the more enlightened form of national self-interest (Lamy 1987, 9). As Fullinwider (1985, 10) explains:

    The patriot must "stand by" his country, right or wrong. But this cannot mean the patriot must always support, condone, participate in, or refuse to criticize the wrongful actions and policies of his country. Where such wrongful actions and policies harm the country, to support and participate in them would be to act against the good of the country.
    In short, myopic national preoccupation has undesirable consequences. In addition, although fostering national interests is an appropriate and desirable component of global education, attention to our own national interests must not obscure any moral obligations we have to the global community. It would be morally wrong not to have some sensitivity to the rights of others in the global community. Furthermore, acting in an equitable and humane way and taking some responsibility for the well-being of others are actions consistent with fostering respect for one's country-the capacity for national self-respect requires, to some extent, the pursuit of policies that its citizens believe to be just or fair, even if they involve some self-sacrifice.
    A third, less frequently discussed form of chauvinism, implied in Anderson's (1979) account of the goals of global education, is "presentism"-a preoccupation with the interests and well-being of current generations to the exclusion of the interests of persons yet to be born into the world. In other words, the felt urgency of our immediate needs and desires may preclude our fair-minded consideration of others' future needs. Concern with this form of chauvinism underlies much criticism about our inadequate sensitivity to the long-term environmental consequences of national policies and consumer decisions.

    Because of the interrelated nature of the elements that constitute the perceptual dimension, many of the previously discussed teaching strategies are likely to encourage nonchauvinism. For example, enhanced open-mindedness and empathy increase the prospect that students will reconsider judgments about their own cultures and nation. Certainly, a crucial factor in promoting nonchauvinism is a classroom environment that encourages debate about the merits or fairness of controversial cultural and national practices. Additional suggestions about how to promote nonchauvinism can be found in the activities and guidelines for teaching about the Columbian Quincentenary that appear in special issues of Social Education (October 1991) and Social Studies and the Young Learner (March/ April 1992). Also, Anderson (1982) and Becker and Anderson (1980) identify many promising ideas and resources for encouraging one or more of the elements of the perceptual dimension of a global perspective.

    Although I have separated the elements within both dimensions, in many respects they are intertwined and certainly they should not be taught in isolation from one another-to do so may be self-defeating. My prime objective in distinguishing various elements is to make clear the complex mix of aspects that constitute a global perspective. As stated earlier, I fear that key elements are often overlooked and that an undifferentiated account creates the impression that promoting a global perspective is an undisciplined (i.e., not rigorous and systematic) educational pursuit. Another reason for distinguishing the elements is to discourage the view that a global perspective is a single quality that one either has or does not have. A global perspective is a blend of elements-each of us will possess certain understandings and attributes to varying degrees (Hanvey 1976, 2).

    As should be apparent, the perceptual dimension is not unique to global education. Its elements are part of an educational ideal that is as old as the very notion of education. Significantly, the Latin word educare means "to lead out." In part, this means to lead out of naive, often mistaken views of the world. I contend that promoting the virtues that make up the perceptual dimension reduce the extent to which students' perceptions of their world, both domestic and international, are distorted by inadequate cognitive lenses. As the examples cited earlier suggest, greater information about a phenomenon may simply reaffirm a parochial perspective-students may see only the stereotypical, the self-serving, and the familiar. To this extent, promoting a global perspective is not merely an important additional curricular objective intended to help students cope with emerging global realities, but a potentially powerful focus for improving the quality of education generally.

    1For an extended discussion of the theory of individuals' constructions of their environments, see Gary T. Moore and Reginald G. Golledge, Environmental Knowing: Theories, Research, and Methods (Stroudsburg, Pa.: Dowden, Hutchinson, and Ross, 1976).References
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    2Other widely cited accounts of the goals of global education include Chadwick F. Alger and James E. Harf, "Global Education: Why? For Whom? About What?," in Promising Practices in Global Education: A Handbook with Case Studies, edited by Robert E. Freeman (New York: National Council on Foreign and International Studies, 1986); Anderson (1979); Becker (1982); Becker and Anderson (1980); and Lamy (1990). Although they employ different categories, for the most part these writers address the same elements covered by Hanvey or Kniep. For example, Alger and Harf (1986) identify five themes or dimensions: values, transactions, actors, procedures and mechanisms, and global issues. Kniep's account expressly mentions the first and last of these elements, and the other three elements are subsumed under Kniep's account of "global systems." Alternatively, Anderson (1979, 343-66) proposes four competencies: competence in perceiving one's involvement in a global society, in making decisions, in reaching judgments, and in exercising influence. His discussion of the first three competencies is coextensive with much of Hanvey's account. Anderson's fourth competency, the ability to influence the world, is not addressed by either Hanvey or Kniep. This is not problematic for my account of a global perspective, however, because I consider promoting global participation or action a separate goal. In fact, I regard promoting a global perspective and promoting global action as the two major goals of global education. Although the two are interrelated, they warrant separate treatment-the former is essentially a way of looking at the world, the latter a way of acting in the world.

    3Although Kniep observes correctly that "content" is what distinguishes global education from other kinds of education (1986, 437), it is important to appreciate that content does not identify all crucial elements of a global perspective. (Kniep does not claim that it does.) A simple analogy will illustrate why identifying the distinguishing features alone is insufficient. Suppose I describe a car solely by distinguishing it from a bicycle-the difference is that the car has a motor. But notice how incomplete my account of a car is if I fail to mention that cars have wheels and are used primarily to transport people, two features they share with bicycles. Similarly, I suggest that essential elements of a global perspective are not unique to global education, but are part of good education generally.

    4For curriculum resources that employ this approach, see Association for Values Education and Research, Peace: In Pursuit of Security, Prosperity, and Justice (Toronto: OISE Press/Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1991).